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Abstract
Crisis prevention is never an easy task and past experiences tell us that great turbulences
may come in many different forms. As for the present global crisis, its inception was a
mixture of errors of economic policy, of greed on the part many creditors and borrowers
across the world and of inadequate financial supervision from many agencies.
This paper tries to pinpoint the roots of the crisis but it goes beyond that, for there is al-
ways an aftermath of the shock that has profound effects in the world economic fabric,
effects which have to be pondered over to understand the range of the meltdown and the
huge problems that lie ahead.
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 1. Introduction
Most people would agree on the five drivers which led to the present global financial
crisis: easy money, the workings of the shadow banking system, the risk transfer delusion,
the failures of regulators and rating agencies and, finally, the unleash of uncertainty.
From 2002 to 2006, the Federal Reserve kept its federal funds rates very low and
the main central banks, specially the European Central Bank, followed suit. But low
interest rates have two effects: they may stimulate economic activity but, if kept for
a long time, they may also create bubbles. And bubbles they created in the stock
exchanges and in the residential sectors. In fact, prolonged periods of very low in-
terest rates increase the incentives to bear risk. (BIS, 2010)
The “shadow banking system” is a term coined by McCulley (2007) to designate
all those intermediaries that are not backstopped by the Federal Reserve or the FDI
deposit insurance; namely investment banks, hedge funds, structured investment
vehicles or conduits, in the USA financial realm. Their common features: they are
highly leveraged and they raise funds by borrowing in the interbank markets or
through issuing commercial paper. To a certain extent, their performance prior to
the great turbulence reminds of a time bomb in search of a date, a crippled flyer in
a flying trapeze.
Risk is the nuts and bolts of finance. If A lends money to B, he expects to be repaid
in time and, to that end, he will previously watch the financial profile of the bor-
rower and maybe ask for collateral. Even so, there is always the possibility that the
lender does not get his money back and that he loses it completely; for risk is the
counterpart of interest. Now, imagine that B sells his contract to C and C to D and
D to F and so on.There is no risk for the sellers because it has been transferred to
the buyers. And imagine, again, that the ultimate borrower is living in a country far
away from the one where the credit originated. And imagine, once more, that there
are thousands of contracts, spread all around the world, kept in the portfolios of 
individuals, banks, corporations, institutional investors and even charities.
Are the sellers on the sunny side of the road once they have transferred the risk?.
Yes and no. Yes if only several of those credits default, for the ultimate owners will
loose their money and no previous seller will be affected; no if thousands of those
credits go bust because delinquency will ricochet all around the world’s financial
markets and everyone, be it seller or buyer, will find itself in a tight spot through
the ensuing liquidity and credit crunch. And that is just what happened when the
subprime scam was unveiled, uncertainty permeated the financial world and the
name of the game turned to be “no credit, no risk”.
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Financial regulators are supposed to regulate, i.e. to create a set of prudential rules
that make it difficult for financial intermediaries to go astray, to find themselves un-
able to perform their duties; in short, regulators should put up safety nets to ensure
that financial shocks have a limited impact. But how about the non regulated inter-
mediaries, the so called “shadow banking system”? No safety net for them or for those
that lend them funds without paying any attention to excess leverage or risk outside
the purview of regulators.
Rating agencies exist to guide investors to invest safely. If they rate an asset with
AAA+ mark or similar, they are sending a message to the markets: this is a solid asset
and the possibility of delinquency is non existent or very low. And most of the time
their standards ring true. Not so in the case of subprimes and some other exotic fi-
nancial packages that obtained the utmost qualifications from several rating agen-
cies, that were sold to investors all around the world and turned into de detonator
of the great meltdown.
Following the “mark to market rule” the value of non performing assets amounted to
zero, since there were no buyer for them. And so the balance sheet of many individuals
and institutions, trapped in the firestorm, suffered from high capital losses. The first ca-
sualty of the mapping up of benefits were the enormous interbank markets, the fulcrums
of the banking activity: banks all around the world borrow huge amounts of money from
other banks, on a very short time basis, to cater for the needs of their clients or to fund
themselves for whatever reason. These markets rely on mutual trust as, normally, no col-
lateral is requested. But if trust fades away, if confidence falters, the interbank markets
cease to perform since suspicion replaces trust: Banks CEOS stop lending other banks
for fear of the rest of the banks having toxic assets in their portfolios. And hence the in-
terbank markets came to a halt, the credit crunch followed, a crunch compounded by
the explosion of uncertainty. Who is to be trusted in a sea of suspicion? Who was to be
trusted when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, in September 2008, making it clear that
no one was too big to fail? Almost no one. In the American financial crisis there were
many sinners and many sins, as Kaufman (2010) has pointed out.
But it will be unfair to put the blame solely on the American financial crack. Many
other economies in the western world had been following the same profligate paths
and had to face similar problems. The Spanish economy, for instance, went through
a golden period, in 2002-2007, boosted by easy money, the construction boom and
the consumption spree. The European Central Bank applied a policy of very low rates
to its tenders from 2002 to 2006; the construction boom followed, spurred by sky-
rocketing demand and boomed by low rates of interest – variable rates in most cases
– and long maturities offered by banks and saving banks; cheap consumer credit made
it possible for many people to buy new cars, to acquire gadgets galore and to go toth
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distant places on vacation. Till the bubbles deflated, in 2008, and the economy went
into recession in 2009. In fact, Spain nurtured its own crisis, though the global finan-
cial meltdown made things much worse.
Trough fiscal stimuli, slashed interest rates by Central banks and huge amounts of
public capital – trough public largesse, in short – recession is fading away in most
OECD countries, as Figure I shows.
 Figure 1. Global GDP Growth (% QoQ, annualized)
SOURCE: IMF STAFF ESTIMATES
Apart from the fact that IMF estimates tend to be sanguine, to avoid any trace of
negative self prophecy, the recovery will be fragile and short lived unless the big re-
maining problems the rich world is facing can be effectively tackled: sovereign debt,
weak financial systems and lack of confidence in the present capitalist model. For
growth and employment depend heavily on finding a solution to those drags.
Section 2 of this paper will, thus, delve into the realm of debt; section 3 will cover
the stress of the Western financial systems; section 4 will tour the intricacies, weak-
nesses and dynamics of XXI century capitalism; and section 5 is just a warning.
 2. The debt mountain 
The world is awash in debt, as Figure 2 shows, for Governments in the OECD area,
have indulged in debt financing to save the day, most probably under the Keynesian
assumption that deficits will push forward the wheels of their economies and, most
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probably too, for the crushing effect of automatic stabilizers. If Governments think
that fiscal stimuli is the key to redressing their economies and, at the same time, they
see their expenses go up and their tax and non tax receipts go down, no wonder they
incur in debt financing. Note, in Figure 2, that, on the whole, debt ran at 75% of nom-
inal GDP in 2007 and will top 100% in 2011.
 Figure 2. General Government Gross Financial Liabilities in OECD
SOURCE: OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 87 DATABASE
To understand the realm of debt financing, let’s recall the simple macroeconomics
of debt effects (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999).
In the short run, debt financing may increase aggregate demand and output: Gov-
ernments rely on fiscal stimuli to prop up the economy but to do so, to increase
their expenses over and above their tax receipts, they have to issue bonds and sell
them in their country or abroad. If fiscal stimuli go on for a long period and many
countries follow the same path, two big problems will loom sooner than later: 1)
How to find the buyers for the debt; and 2) the cost of debt. Right now there is a
“debt jam” across the world financial markets since the large rich countries are is-
suing new debt to finance their new expenses or to pay for the standing debt. Some
Governments, mainly Asian, and many institutional investors, buy Sovereign debt
issues but reluctancy to acquire new debt is in the offing, for Sovereign debt has
ceased to be considered the best bet. And, consequently, risk premiums go up and
raise the cost of new issues.
Crowding private investment pops up as another effect of debt issuing: Lendable
funds will be scarce for private investors. In periods of economic doldrums, theTh
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crowding our effect will not be felt but it will certainly appear as soon as the eco-
nomic conditions improve.
In the medium term, and unless the rate of growth increases, the snowball effect of debt
may become the main issue. To keep the debt-to-GDP ratio constant, the following re-
lationship must hold (Smidth and Hansen, 2010): 
PDt
=Yt -itDt-1
where PD is the primary deficit, D is the total amount of debt, Y stands for nominal
GDP and i represents the average nominal interest paid on government debt. There-
fore a country with nominal growth lower than the interest paid on government
debt will see its primary deficit increase and its total debt balloon. Governments
tend to ignore that debt solvency is a forward looking concept and, by the same
token, they pay scant attention to the dynamics of debt. And yet the snowball ef-
fects have to be tackled rather rapidly by turning primary deficits into primary sur-
plus as soon as possible.
In the long run, and unless governments inflate debt, the common way to solving
the debt problem tends to be increasing taxes. But tax increases reduces private
savings and therefore domestic investment. In the end, increasing taxes will probably
shrink the country capital stock which, in turn, will imply lower output and income.
Not necessarily, since foreign investment may fill the gap, but, in most cases, the
tax increase solution will hinder the path to economic recovery and, generally speak-
ing, as pointed out by Buchanan (1999, Chapter 4) Government debt will shift the
burden to future generations. Any individual may be interested in purchasing gov-
ernment bonds because he understands that, in so doing, his personal portfolio
will be reinforced; but, from the point of view of the economy as a whole, future
generations will have to put up with the cost of debt through additional taxation
and, therefore, their living standards will be eroded.
But there is more to it. To Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), when governments’ debt to
GDP ratio surpasses 90%, growth declines by at least one percentage point a year. Why?
Because heftier taxes, resulting from the increase in public debt, will bite into consumer
spending and corporate investment and put a heavy lid on growth prospects.
So far, we have summarized the macroeconomic effects of debt in any one country
but the present scenario is quite different: it is not about debt in one country since
many countries suffer from the same disease; in fact the developed world is facing
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similar problems. Thus, the debt problem is compounded by simultaneity. And si-
multaneity gives birth to three additional problems: 1) the reassessment of sovereign
credit risk; 2) the impact of fiscal consolidation across the OECD area; 3) the ex-
pected behaviour of political leaders forced to adopt harsh decisions.
The Dubai standstill, at the end of 2009, made it clear to many investors that Sovereign
bonds were not as safe as they used to be. But the real problems have sprung in the
EMU markets, concerning the solvency of some of its members and the possibility
of default in their Sovereign debt. It is to be remembered that the common currency
has resulted in the disappearance of the intra-area exchange risk but, at the same
time, it has linked the financial markets of the group to such extent that default in
one country could initiate a domino effect across the area. So the troubles of
Greece, in May 2010, sent ripples of panic along the world financial markets and
prompted the setting up of the European Financial Stability Facility and the pro-
gram of the European Central Bank to buy securities (IMF, 2010). Pressures on the
Euro area bond markets have eased but, unless some radical change occurs, the re-
assessment of Sovereign risks will hover over the world for years to come.
To veer away from the debt trap, countries have to enter into fiscal consolidation
either by tax increases or by cutting on public expenses since inflating the debt is to
be discarded, given its extremely distorting effects. In the rich world there is not
much room for tax increases; therefore expenses cuts will have to be effected across
the OECD to balance the budget. No small beer in an integrated world where fiscal
stimuli have been the key to avoiding a calamitous depression. So Governments
have to enact credible plans for medium term fiscal cuts on the basis of public ex-
penses reductions. But there are trade-offs to be considered. First of all, cutting
public expenses could hinder the rich world recovery unless private consumption
and investment show a rapid surge. Second, the deficits of many nations will have
to be reduced simultaneously and make adjustments more painful since deficit in
one country props up the external demand of other countries.
Reducing fiscal deficits means implementing austerity plans and austerity is not an easy
pill to be swallowed by western societies. Social unrest may follow and turn into social
upheaval as declining expectations replace rising expectations. So, Governments will
have to face the difficult choice of upsetting the markets or upsetting the voters; and
casting away votes and political power really upsets politicians. It may, thus, happen
that Governments set a balancing course, which means austerity, and as soon as the
first improvements loom up, indulge once more in the expansionary policies that so far
have helped to avert the worst effects of recession but that should be set aside by any
country eager to sail into safe waters. Kind of stop and go political decisions absolutely
unfit for almost any country in the Western world, and leading nowhere.th
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 3. The global financial system 
Financial experts would probably agree on the pre-crisis financial errors as pointed out
by Walter (2010): “too much leverage in the banking and financial system and not
enough high quality capital to absorb losses; excessive credit growth based on weak
underwriting standards and underpricing of liquidity and credit risk; insufficient liquidity
buffers and overly aggressive maturity transformation; inadequate risk governance and
poor incentives to manage risks towards prudent long term outcomes; inadequate cush-
ions in banks to mitigate the inherent pro ciclicality of financial markets and its
participants; too much systemic risks interconnectedness among financial players”.
Right now the proposals to rein in the financial markets flow in from Governments
and agencies and first and foremost is the Obama Administration Regulatory Re-
form (2010). It’s an all-encompassing proposal aimed at regulating markets and
participants in order to avoid future shocks. Its main highlights:
1. Create a Financial Services Oversight Council to facilitate information sharing 
and coordination;
2. Implement consolidates supervision and regulation of large interconnected 
financial firms;
3. Strengthen capital and prudential standards for all banks and bank holding 
companies (BHC);
4. Close loopholes in bank regulation through the creation of a National Bank 
Supervisor to supervise and regulate all federally chartered depository 
institutions and all federal branches and agencies of foreign banks; 
5. Eliminate the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) programs for 
consolidate supervision and put them under the Federal Reserve; 
6. Require hedge funds, and other private pools of capital to register with the 
SEC; 
7. Strengthen the regulatory framework around the money market mutual 
funds; 
8. Enhance oversight of the insurance sector; 
9. Establish comprehensive regulation of financial markets, including over the 
counter derivatives and credit default swaps;
10. Protect consumers and investors from financial abuse;
11. Provide the Government with the tools it needs to manage financial crises; 
12. Raise international regulatory standards and improve international coo-
peration.
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Financial intermediation, as Goodhart recalls, is inherently pro ciclycal (Goodhart,
2009). During upturns, profitability and assets prices rise, defaults and non performing
loans decline, volatility goes down, banks and financial intermediaries increase leverage
to benefit from new opportunities and moral hazard goes into oblivion. When downturn
bursts in, the reverse happens. So counter- cyclical regulatory requirements are supposed
to come to the fore to avoid costly miscalculations, and part of the American and Basle
proposals go that way. Will they meet with success? Perhaps not.
The Basel Committee on the Global Financial System is working on a reform program
intended to regulate world financing and based on micro prudential and macro pruden-
tial elements. Among the micro prudential elements, the Committee stresses the need
to ensure that intermediaries can count on high quality capital to absorb losses and that,
to this end, they set aside countercyclical buffers to absorb unexpected shocks; and, with
this in mind, it insists in the need that profits, once returned to the pre-crisis levels, be
used to build those buffers and not to feed high bonuses, dividends and leverage.
To test the resilience of European banks, the Committee of European Banking Supervision
has launched an EU-wide stress test exercise that includes a sample of 91 European banks
(saving banks are not excluded) to asses the ability of banks to absorb credit and market
risks (CEBS, 2010).The sample includes 91 European banks, representing 65% of the Eu-
ropean market in terms of total assets. So far the test has been fairly positive, as only 7
banks have failed to pass it under adverse scenarios that also includes sovereign shocks.
To follow on, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has just approved the Basel
III (2010) capital requirements. In short, it stresses the need to set new standards in re-
lation to risk-weighted assets. In compliance with them, banks, in the member countries,
should increase the amount of common equity, the highest form of loss absorbing cap-
ital, and gradually reinforce the minimum ratio between capital instruments and risk-
weighted assets. This regulatory adjustment will be phased so that banks can meet the
new requirements without impairing the economic recovery. In 2011, the minimum total
capital will stay at 8%, though equity capital should increase, and, by January 2019,
total capital should reach 10.5%. Moreover, the Committee puts forward the need to
build a countercyclical buffer within a range of 0%-2.5% of loss absorbing capital to
protect the banking sector from unexpected shocks.
And there are many other regulations in the offing concerning the global financial system.
Among them new regulations of derivative activities in the sense that over-the-counter
exposures will be subject to higher capital requirements, especially when they are not
cleared through central counterparties. It is part of the macro prudential elements an-
nounced by the Basel Committee. To top it all up, the idea of a financial transaction tax
is being discussed in the USA, in the European Union and in the International Monetaryth
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Fund and many Government officials, here and there, are keen on the issue, maybe be-
cause they think that taxing the banks will be a good start to chastise them or, in fact,
because in, a sea of deficits, banking on the tax will increase the public receipts. 
No decision has so far been taken, given the complexity of financial transactions and the
difficulty to assess the tax effects. But, in any case, taxing the financial transactions, be
it a turnover tax or a profit tax or any other kind of tax – all of them reminders of the
Tobin proposal of 1978, intended to curb speculation in the currency markets – the end
result will be more regulation, more red tape and additional costs to credit borrowers. 
At first glance, the intended reform seems to be an assertive, sweeping reform aimed
at revamping the rules that govern financial markets, in an effort to clamp down on
lending practices, to reduce the prociclicality of the world financial system and to ex-
pand consumer protection. On second thoughts, the reforms are open to several ques-
tions. First of all, the problem of ultra-regulation. Almost every inch of the global
financial system, especially the rich world financial system, will be highly regulated;
but if regulation permeates the ups and downs of financial markets, the outcome will
most probably be a terrific loss of efficiency and remarkable cost increases due to an
excess of red tape at best; or, at worst, a continuous motorized legislation towering
over institutions and markets (Hirst, 2000).
And there are two conundrums to be reckoned with: First, banking is a highly innova-
tive activity and, faced with crushing constraints, banks may find ways to avoid them
without breaking them. Past experience shows that regulators tend to lag behind in-
novations. If the cost of bank capital rises, the spread of deposit and loan rates will
also rise and investment and growth will be impaired. And more so if requirements in
relation to risk-weighted assets induce bankers to concentrate on public assets and re-
duce their private assets exposure.
Second: nowadays, finance is a world wide activity: markets are integrated, most banks
are international banks, in as much as their lending and funding are cross-border, and
derivatives are criss-crossing the whole financial world. Thus, if regulations are not world
wide, many financial transactions may look for friendly shores and leave the regulated
parts of the markets.
 4. Will capitalism survive? 
When reflecting upon the present turmoil, many people, all around the world, see it as
the offspring of the dominant form of capitalism: financial capitalism. What they look at
is the messy landscape of investment bankers, of high flying executives extremely well paid
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and compensated, if fired, and of a long list of banks, financial companies and corpora-
tions being bailed out with taxpayers money; and, at the same time, they also see that
unemployment is increasing so that, even in the rich world, poverty is creeping forward.
For these people, there is a clear culprit: financial capitalism. And there is only a way
out of the present and future crisis: replace capitalism by some sort of socialism, be it
“soft-governments” supervising most economic transactions or “hard-governments”
deciding on every economic transaction.
In 1986, Minsky, an American economics professor, who taught mainly at Washington
University in St. Louis, published a book which explained, at length, his ideas about the
capitalist economy or, to be more precise, about financial capitalism (Minsky, 1986,
Chapter 13).To Minsky, “market capitalism is both intrinsically unstable and can lead
to distasteful distributions of wealth and power” (Minsky, 1986).
To fully understand his reasoning, it is useful to read his 1992 paper on “The Financial
Stability Hypothesis”. For him, financial capitalism is not an equilibrium seeking system
since its performance is tainted by the level of profits. And profit-seeking treads different
paths: hedge finance, speculative finance and Ponzi finance. If firms follow hedge fi-
nancing, prospective income flows will cover interest and principal of their debt; if they
follow speculative finance, income flows will cover only debt instruments; if they follow
Ponzi finance, their receipts will cover neither interest nor principal, and debt will sky-
rocket. Over periods of prolonged prosperity, firms will try to rely on speculative and
Ponzi financing till the whole system finds itself in deep trouble. Thus, financial capi-
talism is an intrinsically unstable system prone to generate its own turbulences and its
own business cycles.
Needless to add that his agenda for reform, to attain a less flawed capitalism, relies
heavily on government intervention (Minsky, 1986).
Looking at the 2008 shock and its aftermath, the Minsky explanation seem to be rather
catching. In fact, Minsky (1986) is related to Keynes in at least two aspects: the business
cycle and the volatility of investment. And, no doubt, Keynesian economics is fashion-
able again, in the sense that many scholars, pundits and politicians sense that the melt-
down can only be overcome by public intervention.
So much so that Davidson, the custodian of the Keynesian holy grail, has insisted in the
need to set up an International Monetary Clearing Union (IMCU) with three objectives: 
1. To prevent a lack of global effective market demand due to liquidity problems 
and to ensure global full employment.th
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2. To provide an automatic mechanism to correct international trade imbalan -
ces and place the burden of correcting on the nation running persistent export 
surpluses.
3. To provide each nation with the ability to monitor and control financial 
movements out of the nation. (Davidson, 2009). Even Keynes, noted by his 
alacrity to change his mind, would wholly agree on this proposal which 
replicates his own plan of 1941!
In Keynes country, there is no dearth of Keynesian ideas. To Skidelsky, the well known
Keynes biographer, the UK financial system “has become master, not servant, of pro-
duction” (Skidelsky, 2009) and is in need of more regulation.For instance, he advocates
the Glass-Steagall philosophy of separating commercial banking from investment bank-
ing, based on the fact that commercial banking runs on deposits and investment banking
on investor’s money. Therefore, the former should not be allowed to indulge in high-
risk lending whereas the latter could gamble with their investor’s funds, though they
should be excluded from any public bailouts .With an additional proviso, in line with
the separation between the two kinds of banks: that multinational banking should be
subject to some kinds of restrictions.
Going back to the Keynes assertion that the propensity to save is stronger that the
propensity to invest, Skidelsky follows the Keynesian suggestion that monetary policy
should strive to maintain low interest rates while fiscal policy should be directed to
achieve a continuous high level of public or semipublic investment. Yet this policy needs
an international dimension, the more so in an integrated world, and a new Bretton
Woods is needed so that member countries accept that reserves could be set aside for
insurance needs but not for piling up international reserves (Skidelsky, 2009).
Another well known Keynesian, Krugman, stated, a decade ago, that “anything that has
to be rescued during a financial crisis, because it plays an essential role in the financial
mechanism, should be regulated when there isn’t a crisis, so that it doesn’t take excessive
risks” (Krugman, 1999). And he concludes that the ideas of Keynes are now more rele-
vant than ever to redress the sad state of many economies.
After a detailed description of the financial crisis, Roubini, considered to be the harbinger
of the present meltdown, and Mihm, reject the wonders of unregulated financial markets
and the fruits of financial innovation (Roubini and Mihm, 2010). They call for a re-
vamping of the financial system which would regulate every piece of it, to close loop-
holes, and since financial crisis do not respect national boundaries, they insist in
regulating across the borders. Both economists are not self proclaimed Keynesians but
their recipes sound very much Keynesian.
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Actually, the gist of the Keynesian approach is to be linked to his “animal spirits” idea:
rational motivations explain many economic decisions but many other economic activ-
ities are governed no by calculus but by an spontaneous urge to act (Keynes, 1936). So,
while showing tremendous creative capabilities, capitalism cannot be left to its own de-
vices for it has a tendency to pursue excess and beget crises. Therefore, the role of gov-
ernments is to set the stage not to rein in its creativity but to countervail excesses (Akerlof
and Shiller, 2009).
And if we leave theoretical economists and turn to high office politicians, we will find
the same appetite for regulation. President Obama is very keen on regulation, President
Sarkozy plays the same fiddle and many other European leaders are convinced that gov-
ernment intervention and regulation are the only solutions to escape the present quag-
mire. Political leaders are supposed to respond to the angst of their constituencies and
the mood of western societies is not in favour of free markets for the time being. Thus,
in their view, instability and unpredictability ought to be mopped up by the judicious
steerage of governments.
In a world of technological integrated financial markets and freedom of capital move-
ments, financial markets tend to be both unstable and hardly predictable, in other words
they tend to be volatile, as can be seen in Figure 3 concerning the S&P Index. The more
so since institutional investors – pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance
companies and the like -, the managers of large pools of money, are the major players
in these markets.
 Figure 3. Stocks markets historical and implied volatility
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Any other index will go the same way, will show that we are living in an unstable
economic universe which spells doubt and fears and makes people to look for gov-
ernment protection and regulations. 
But, will public intervention across the board and across borders slash instability
and give way to another long stint of global economic prosperity? We can only an-
swer the question by bringing to the fore some other questions?
Question number one: 
Which will be the limit of public intervention? For intervention means protection
and government protection has a parthenogenetic bias: protection in one market
normally leads to protecting some other markets, financial and non financial, till
the whole of the economy is suffering from the same disease: lack of dynamism.
Question number two: 
Financial regulations will be accepted by all countries in the world? If not, the non
accepting countries will probably attract large slices of financial activities and
transform the financial world in a land of winners take all.
Question number three:
Will international trade remain unaffected by regulations? So far, international
trade in goods and services has been one of the great engines of prosperity but no-
body can assure that the spill-over of public intervention do not reach international
trade. Past experiences go the other way round.
And here comes the grand fourth question: 
Will capitalism survive? In 1942, Schumpeter took a negative stance on the matter
(Schumpeter, 1942) but nowadays the right answer could probably be: yes, it will
survive but in a different form.
It will survive because there is no other suitable alternative, unless serious minded
people come to accept that the present non market economies will, in the end,
pave the way to prosperity; it will survive because capitalism is the only system that
protects individual freedom: no democratic structure has been able to survive when
private property is banned and markets cease to exist; finally, it will survive because
it is a protean system that can transform itself, as history reveals.
And yet, there is a nondescript risk: 
That, for a long time, Western capitalism will become a monitored system, per-
meated by regulations, and suffering from scant economic muscle. Not a consum-
mation devoutly to be wished.
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 5. Final remark
The shape of the global economy had been changing since the eighties and, by the middle
of the present decade, it showed the rise of the Asian world and several other emergent
countries, the slight decline of the USA powerhouse and the not so slight decline of the
European Union. The global financial crisis of 2007 and the ensued meltdown have
brought to the fore a new set of problems concerning the ways and means of overcoming
the shock and restoring the engines of growth; not an easy task for the rich world, for
the Western economies, especially for those that have been spending beyond their means
for a long time. To cut down their public and private debt without endangering their
economic recovery and keeping social unrest at bay will take a lot of political capabilities,
on the part of governments, and new measures of international cooperation. Not the
cooperation of words but the cooperation of facts. Otherwise the coming years will not
be a time of gradual recovery but a period of economic and political upheaval.
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